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Abstract
This thesis analyzes the changes and continuity within Turkish foreign policy since 2002,
under the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi - AKP). In order to
understand modern Turkish politics, it is important to realize Turkey’s aspirations of becoming a
full member of the European Union and its subsequent push for strategic alliances with the
Middle East and former Turkic republics from the Soviet Union. The evidence shows that
Turkey has consistently strived to improve its relationship with the EU in its effort to become a
full member state, but the EU’s reluctance to accept Turkey as an equal member state has led to
enduring obstacles and an unfinished journey since 1987. Turkey’s strategic geographical
location (Afro-Eurasia) makes it possible to pursue a multi-dimensional foreign policy in the
region. Furthermore, the thesis also examines the influence of national identity (Turkism /
Turkishness) and religious identity (Islam for the Ottomanism) that play an important role in
determining Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East, Balkans and Turkic states in Caucasus
and Central Asia. Turkish foreign policy has shifted from a Hobbesian realism to a slightly more
Kantian approach that espouses diplomacy, negotiation, and other civilian instruments such as
economic and multilateral cooperation. This new approach was also adopted toward the Arab
world, with which relations have significantly improved under AKP government. Relations with
the West have been viewed as complementary to, rather than a substitute for, relations with the
Islamic world.1 In this context, during the Ottoman Empire, Islam was seen as the pillar of
Ottoman society. This society was based on the millet system, - a system which was defined
according to the society’s' religion rather than ethnic or national communities by the Ottoman
Empire.2 Islam and Ottomanism were meant to build continuity between Turkey’s foreign policy
toward Europe and in the Middle East, Balkans, Turkic states in Caucasus and Central Asia.

1
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CHAPTER I
Research Questions and Hypothesis
This thesis traces the changes and continuities in Turkey’s foreign policy under the ruling
AKP government since 2002. I argue in this thesis that Turkey is increasing a multidimensional
approach for improving its relations with Western and Eastern countries. I further argue that
Turkey, under the leadership of the AKP, is pursuing policies that build alliances with the
Middle East and former Islamic republics in the region, while maintaining its aspirations for full
acceptance into the European Union (EU). There is also an emerging religious surge and
nationalism that draw from Turkey’s historical, geographical and cultural ties to nearby states in
the Middle East. For that reason, the AKP government took a series of new initiatives to expand
and improve Turkish foreign policy toward the Middle East. In addition, I argue that Turkey
does not seek to deny its relationship with the West, but rather hopes to expand its sphere of
influence by building new alliances with former Islamic states in the region, such as the Balkans
and former Soviet Republics. Instead of severing ties with the EU, the Turkish government
strives to build a strong and secure modern nation-state.
The current Turkish government is also rediscovering its own Ottoman historical roots
and religious national identity. Turkey’s lost prestige, as a result of the European Union’s denial
of membership since April 1987, paved the way for a historic choice to adopt a multidimensional
foreign policy approach that draws on Turkey’s historical, geographical and cultural ties to
nearby states in the Middle East. Turkey finds itself in a unique position to balance its aspirations
of being fully accepted as a European Union member, while upholding its historical ties with the
Middle East. This thesis demonstrates how Turkey’s foreign policy has evolved since the AKP
came to power and analyzes why it became critical for Turkey to pursue a multidimensional
4

approach. I argue that the European Union’s ambiguity about Turkey’s full membership, since
1987, led the AKP government to initiate a series of steps to expand and improve its relationship
with the Middle East.
In this effort to improve its relationship with Middle Eastern countries and the former
Islamic republics, Turkey highlighted its own Ottoman historical roots to gain political position
and prestige as Turks. In describing the transformation of Turkey’s foreign policy, the scholarly
debate refers to these changes as a “more independent, active and multidimensional” approach in
the Middle East. During the AKP government’s first term in power in 2002, the push for the EU
membership was central to Turkish foreign policy. However, since the denial of full accession by
the EU in 2007, an important aspect of Turkish foreign policy has been an increased dialogue
with the Middle East by the AKP government during its second term in office. It is also
important to note that the current AKP government’s foreign policy is influenced by
conservative constituencies. The recent emphasis on Islamism indicates a rebirth of nationalism
in AKP’s modern politics. In this context, this research examines how the AKP conducted
Turkish foreign policy since 2002. In seeking answers to the following questions, this paper will
employ the concepts of transformation, change and continuity, under the AKP’s foreign policy
experience since 2002.
1. Why did Turkey pursue a multidimensional foreign policy approach?
2. What is the evidence to show that the AKP tried to improve its relations with the EU in
an effort to gain full membership?
3. What evidence is there that Turkey has increased religious and nationalist identity?
4. What evidence is there that Turkey sees itself as a legacy of the Ottoman Empire in
relation to the Middle East, Balkans, and Turkic Republics in Caucasus and Central Asia?

5

Methodology
For the purpose of this thesis, I will rely on qualitative methods. Firstly, I use secondary
source materials and literatures about Turkey’s foreign policy. Secondly, I include interviews
and newspaper articles to shed light on Turkish foreign policy since 2002. Moreover, I use
related books, articles, journals, reports and interviews with academic and professional experts.
Turkish foreign policy leaders, under AKP, have been implementing a policy of “zero
problems with neighbors” and a “soft power role” in the Middle East from the beginning of 2004
as a strategy. Moreover, the AKP has implemented a “multi-dimensional” approach since they
assumed power in the government, which has contributed to a transformation of Turkish foreign
policy and the rising importance of Turkey’s diplomatic role, especially in the Middle East.
Throughout the AKP era, there has been a constant emphasis on the use of soft power, and an
improvement of relations with all neighboring countries.3 According to an interview in Foreign
Affairs’ magazine with Former President of Turkey, Abdullah Gul, a former foreign minister and
prime minister and Turkey's head of state and commander in chief, he embraced defending both
Turkey's Muslim identity and its pluralistic values. Gul has quietly pursued a more moderate and
progressive path for championing the rule of law, and helping reorient his country's foreign
policy eastward while remaining a forceful advocate of integration with Europe.4

3

Onis, Ziya. "Multiple Faces of the “New” Turkish Foreign Policy: Underlying Dynamics and a Critique." Insight
Turkey 13.1 (2011): 55. Web.
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CHAPTER II
Review of the Literature
In recent years, numerous books and articles have been published about Turkey’s modern
foreign policy. This literature describes how Turkey’s foreign policy has been shaped by its
relations with the European Union and Middle East, while providing a reevaluation of Turkey’s
Ottoman past. This section reviews some of the literature on Turkish foreign policy since 2002,
analyzing the changes and continuities under the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve
Kalkinma Partisi, AKP). The literature also shows that the pursuit of a multidimensional
approach and rediscovery of Turkey’s identity as a Muslim country produces a new
understanding of Turkish foreign policy.
Ozlem Terzi analyzes the influence of the European Union (EU) and changes in Turkish
foreign policy in the decades of the pre-accession process. Based on the concept of
‘Europeanization’ from the aspects of social, perception, values, identity and behavior of actors
involved in the making of foreign policy, the author discusses the influence of the EU on
changes in Turkish foreign policy (TFP) . Moreover, she explains the challenges and issues that
changed in TFP and the transformation of the policy makers’ mind set (a shift in the balance of
power between actors involved in the process of policy making). She also examines the
experience that TFP went through since 1999. “The AKP government has been comparatively
much more proactive than previous governments in pursuing ambitious foreign policy goals.” 5
Galip Dalay and Dov Friedman describes the history that is rooted in a tradition of both
continuity and change vis-à-vis the AKP’s political Islamist predecessors, the Welfare (Refah)
5

Terzi, Ozlem. The Influence of the European Union on Turkish Foreign Policy. Farnham Surrey: Ashgate, 2010.
135. Print.
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Party and Virtue (Fazilet) Party. By understanding the values, motivations, failures and lessons
of the AKP’s political ancestors, it may give us a better understanding of the last decade of the
AKP’s foreign policy and its continuing evolution. In this regard, “the ways the AKP
understands the Welfare Party’s failures and seeks to transcend it help frame the evolution of
AKP’s foreign policy and illuminate the reassessment necessitated by the Syrian uprising.”6 The
AKP shaped its vision around the lessons learned from its ancestor parties, “the EU policy
marked a major shift for the AKP from its Welfare party. Just as important, it centered the
AKP’s early foreign policy agenda on domestic considerations which strengthened the party’s
position at home.”7 Turkey’s political Islamist tradition has envisioned a great role for the
country internationally. According to Ahmet Davutoglu’s foreign policy vision, Turkey should
stand as a “central power” in the world. In short, nearly two decades after the Welfare Party
articulated a different vision of how Turkey could become a leading power, the AKP in pursuing
a foreign policy its predecessors failed to recognize or support.
E. Fuat Keyman and Sebnem Sunucu examine Turkey’s transformation under the rule of
a dominant party, AKP, they examine the modern history of Turkey, the concept of
transformation and AKP’s hegemony in Turkish politics. “That transformation under the AKP
generates a new center and empowers new actors through economic, social and political
transformation, while undermining the power of secular elite, that is, the military and judiciary,
through civilianization of politics.”8 They argue that Turkey’s foreign policy activism
transformed its standing in the international community while improving economic relations

6

Dalay, Galip, and Dov Friedman. "The AK Party and the Evolution of Turkish Political Islam’s Foreign Policy."
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particularly in the region, ultimately feeding into AKP’s hegemony at home. The AKP’s identity
as a center-right party, promised economic growth (neoliberal economics- greater integration
with the global economy via expanding exports and inflow of foreign direct investments),
stability, democratization and improved public service to the people have been particular success
under the AKP rule in the last decade. The hegemony of the AKP, which has been a function of
multidimensional change in Turkey, allowed the party to carry out this transformation in the
areas of economic modernization, Europeanization and an expanded foreign policy.
M. Hakan Yavuz examines the social and political roots of AKP, in his book “The
Emergence of a new Turkey.” He is looking for the answer to the question of “what are the major
constitutive principles of the ideology and identity of the AKP, and how is the party different
from earlier Islamic parties in Turkey?”9 Yavuz affirms about the inevitable clash of the
Kemalist and Islamist ideologies in terms of rise of the political Islam as the failure of Kemalism
or the demise of Islamism with the rise of Kemalism. Moreover, Yavuz examines the origins and
policies of AKP in terms of social and political context of the new Muslim actors, the Islamist
bourgeoisie, the AKP’s identity, its politics and its relationship with Islamic political groups.
Especially the Islamic bourgeoisie, because the bourgeoisie provides the financial means to
develop the political movement through its charities, TV stations, radios and newspapers. “The
AKP has a good understanding of Ottoman history. This history provides them a rich laboratory
of insight and lessons that are useful for guiding current politics.”10
The authors, Nesecan Balkan, Erol Balkan and Ahmet Oncu, study neoliberalism and the
rise of Islamist capital relationships and the emergence of a new class, the Islamist bourgeoisie –
the Islamist middle classes- in their book, “The Neoliberal Landscape and the Rise of Islamist
9
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Utah, 2006. Print.
10
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Capital in Turkey.” They examine Turkey’s relationship with Islam and Islamism. Moreover, the
dynamics behind the rise of Islamists were reasons for the success and resilience of the AKP.
They also argue that there is a political and ideological battle between the Kemalist and
democratic Islamist government. The authors analyze how the Islamist movement in Turkey, as
represented by the AKP, has become a model for some Islamist movements around the world.
The authors argue that “the ideology of capitalist Islam is finding a new footing and capitalism
continues in the form of a neoliberal Islam.”11
Sebnem Cevik and Philip Seib write about Turkey’s growing geostrategic importance (a
bridge between Europe and Asia). They analyze Turkey’s foreign policy based on ‘value based’
and ‘zero-problems with neighbors (komsularla sifir sorun)’ policies as a ‘soft power’ in the
Middle East. Moreover, Turkey’s Ottoman past is a factor for reemerging cooperation between
Turkey and the Balkans. Cevik and Seib also examine Turkey’s institutions that directly or
indirectly work in establishing diplomacy and influence in the region. They write about
“Turkey’s ‘soft power’ efforts largely focused on the country’s Ottoman heritage which
resonates well with Africa, Balkan and Middle Eastern audiences.”12 Thus, they argue that
Turkey’s foreign policy involvement with Muslim countries projects its strategic influence.
Senem Aydin and Rusen Cakir argue that “an overwhelming majority of AKP members
view the EU as the primary anchor of Turkish democracy and modernization. Yet, the growing
mistrust towards the EU as a result of inferred discrimination and double-standard practices by
the EU has a serious potential to reverse these perceptions within the party.”13 They also write
about how the EU accession process played a crucial role in the renewed formation of Turkey’s
11
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Islamic identity. “The incompatibility of Western values with Islam is also often invoked
together with claims that instead of pressing for EU membership, Turkey should look more
towards the East.”14
Ayla Gol discusses the Turkish state transformation with reference to the complex
interplay between Islam, modernity and Turkish foreign policy. She critically analyzes Turkey’s
historical engagement with European modernity as the transformation of an Islamic, Ottoman
state and particularly its foreign policy towards the Middle East. Thus, she claims that Turkey
shifted its foreign policy towards the Middle East under the AKP (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi),
by emphasizing it’s cultural and historical ‘soft’ power. She also argues the importance of
“nationalism as a third pillar of the interdisciplinary approach to understand the foreign policy of
a transitional state.”15

Conclusion
By analyzing the various recent studies regarding Turkish foreign policy, we can observe
the complexities of Turkey’s relationships with the European Union and the Middle East in the
past few decades. My thesis adds to the literature by attempting to examine the transformation
of Turkish foreign policy in terms of change and continuity since 2002, under the Justice and
Development Party (AKP). This paper’s primary objective is to demonstrate how the ongoing
Turkey-EU accession negotiations, since 1987, led the AKP to make adjustments in its foreign
policy. For instance, Turkey’s involvement with the Islamic world is an active effort to negotiate
affairs between the Middle East and the West. This multidimensional approach to foreign policy
is an opportunity to learn and improve relations between all countries involved in the age of
14
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globalization. The change is from one dimensional policy to multidimensional and from realist
approach to liberal international foreign policy practices. The new geopolitical vision, under the
AKP period, has a strong sense of geopolitical continuity within the immediate region of Turkey.
This continuity indicates that, given historical, social, cultural, and geo-economic intersections,
the territory of Turkey is considered inseparable from its surrounding geographies. This
geopolitical reasoning gives a unique place to Turkey in its foreign policy.

12

CHAPTER III
Historical Background
Turkish foreign policy, Kemalism or also known as Ataturkism, was implemented by
Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the founding ideology of the Republic of Turkey, after the collapse of
the Ottoman Empire (1908-1922). Turkey went through a major modernization under the
Kemalist reforms. “This revolution imposed from above was designed to achieve Ataturk’s
objective of attaining the level of ‘contemporary civilization’.”16 Ataturk embraced reforms such
as: civil, political, social, cultural, and religious and secularism, including the establishment of
democracy during his presidency (1923-1938). Turkish foreign policy had been firmly anchored
upon the verities of Kemalism for about 60 years, with the expression of “Peace at home, Peace
Abroad.”
Turkey experienced a shift in foreign policy under the leadership of Turgut Ozal (19831993), who became the first civilian president since the military coup in 1960. During his tenure,
first as prime minister from 1983 through 1989 and then president from 1989 until 1993, the
Turkish leader was characterized by his singular involvement in the restructuring of the Turkish
economy and robust internal and activist foreign policy. His style of governance represented
many common themes with British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher that some in Turkey called
Ozalism.17
Ozalism is the period of Turgut Ozal’s leadership (1983-1993) in Turkish Foreign Policy.
Ozal implemented liberal policies and abandoned inward oriented economic and foreign policies.
“In the 1980s, Turkey’s political agenda was dominated by high economic growth rate, and
16
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revolutionary structural change towards an industrial country. Under Ozal’s liberal economic
policies, the Turkish economy grew at an annual rate of over five percent.”18 ‘Again a great
Turkey’ was one of the slogan from Ozalism’s economic success and regaining of national
confidence. This also affected the conduct of Ozalist foreign policy. Ozal argued that Western
civilization was not the only civilization on earth, and that Turkey did not have to choose
between either European, Turkish or Islamic civilizations. For Ozal, the Turks were European
Muslims; therefore Turkey did not need to change its mentality or civilizational mode to be
European. He argued that Turkey had always been, still is, and would be a part of Europe.
Moreover, “Ozal argued the Turkish version of Islam is different from the Iranian or the Arab
Islam for integrating with Europe and western systems. He claimed that the Turkish Islamic
outlook could provide peace between Muslims and the others, since religion and progress could
go hand in hand.”19 In short, Ozal fused the political, economic and cultural systems of previous
Turkism, Ottomanism, Conservatism and Liberalism into a new kind of Ottomanism or rather
Ozalism.
“People are not the servants of the state, but the state must be servant of the people.”
Turgut Ozal, 1993
The Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi, abbreviated as ANAP) was founded by Turgut
Ozal in 1983. “The ANAP was considered a center-right neoliberal, conservative, nationalist and
social democrat party.”20 ANAP took ownership of the neoliberal political agenda as opposed to
the agendas of other political parties. Ozal described the state’s role as a regulator. Therefore,
Turgut Ozal followed a different path with neoliberalism, something Turkish politics were not
familiar with until 1983. Ozal was an admirer of the American political, cultural and economic
18
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system. His dream was to make Turkey another America – his role model. It can be argued that
Ozal’s ideology consisted of American secularism, American democracy, American capitalism
and American liberalism. Therefore, Turkish-American relations were vital for Ozal’s domestic
and external policies. “One of the main pillars of Ozalism, with its Turkism and Islamism, was
liberalism and American-type democracy. For Ozal, all these principles were compatible, not
contradictory.”21
During Ozal’s administration, the term neo-Ottomanism was introduced by a leading
Turkish columnist and academic Cengiz Candar and this movement advocated Turkish pursuit of
an active and diversified foreign policy in the region based on Ottoman historical heritage. NeoOttomanism envisioned Turkey as a leader of the Muslim and Turkic worlds and a central power
in Eurasia.22 Ozal wanted to have an effective foreign policy after the collapse of the Soviet
Union both in world politics and especially in the Middle East. Ozal used to preach the slogan,
saying the, “21st century must be led by Turkey and the Turkish people.”23 The goal was for
Turkey to serve as a model for the newly independent republics of the former Soviet Union– the
predominantly Muslim countries of Central Asia and the Caucasus that were secular, democratic,
free market oriented, and aligned with the West. “Turkey desired to export its ideology and
regime to the Turkish - speaking republics to form alliances in a particularly unstable region of
the world.”24 Turgut Ozal wanted to assume a new role for Turkey in foreign policy as a “bridge”
between the East and the West by using Turkey’s geographic location. Turkey’s geography has
played an important role in shaping its foreign policy.

Turkey’s Geographic Importance
21
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Turkey is surrounded on three sides by sea. It provides a natural passage between Europe
and Asia as the country rests on both continents. The passageways between the two continents
are controlled by the straights of Bosporus and the Dardanelles.
Turkey’s geography that is most relevant to its foreign policy includes: its
strategically important seas and straights; its status as a country that rests in both
Asia and Europe; its geopolitical position as a state bordered by the Soviet Union
during the Cold War and its location and history in the Middle East. These
straights have played a prominent role in Turkey’s foreign affairs. Throughout
history, the straights increased Turkey’s importance in the world arena because of
its power to deny passage through these waterways, and its commitment that it
would not hesitate to do so if this were required for the country’s safety in times
of war. Turkey’s exclusive control of the straights of Bosporus and the
Dardanelles even contributed to its entry as a central figure into Cold War
politics.25

The Rise of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) Platform
The success of the AKP in the early 2000s can be traced to inroads made in the 1990s by
the Welfare Party (WP; Refah Partisi), an Islamic party founded in 1983 by Prof. Dr. Necmettin
Erbakan (1926-2011). Necmettin Erbakan turned Turkish Islamism into an independent and
stable political movement in the 1970s.26 Necmettin Erbakan, the long-time leader of Turkey’s
Islamic political movement, was a Prime Minister (June 28th, 1996 - June 30th 1997) in the
country’s first Islamic-led coalition. Despite political bans and party closures, he always reemerged and never wavered from his belief in Islamic Turkey.

In 1970, Erbakan established the National Order Party (Milli Nizam Partisi, MNP), which
advocated a return to religious values and national vision movement (Milli Gorus Hareketi). The
party was closed in 1971, then re-emerged in 1973 as the National Salvation Party, (Milli
25
26
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Selamet Partisi - MSP). Twice in the 1970s, Erbakan briefly served as deputy Prime Minister
(the second time was during the Cyprus crisis of 1974). The 1980 military coup banned the
National Salvation Party and put Erbakan in prison. In 1983, Erbakan founded the Welfare Party
(Refah Partisi - RP) and he emerged as leader of conservative this party. In 1995, Erbakan led his
party to unexpected electoral success with 21 per cent of the national vote. In 1996, after striking
a coalition deal with another party leader, Erbakan became first Islamist Prime Minister of
Turkey. “In 1997, the coalition government was forced to resign by military memorandum and
the Constitution court shot down the Welfare party and put a political ban on Erbakan for
violating the constitutional and principle of secularism.”27 Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi - FP) soon
replaced the Welfare party in 1999. Recai Kutan and Abdullah Gul competed for the party
leadership in the first congress of the Virtue Party in 2000.

Recai Kutan won the leadership of the Virtue Party, but this leadership competition was
seen as a battle between the “traditionalist” (represented by Erbakan’s close aids) and the
“reformist” (represented by Abdullah Gul) within Turkish Islamism. Although, Abdullah Gul
lost the leadership race, the reformist soon prevailed in the entire movement. Recep Tayyip
Erdogan (a former mayor of Istanbul [1994–98]) emerged as a candidate for a new Islamist
leadership. Mr. Erdogan and Mr. Gul founded the Justice and Development Party’s (Adalet ve
Kalkinma Partisi - AKP) in 2001 and won a quick victory in the parliamentary elections of 2002,
taking 34 per cent of popular vote. Mr. Erdogan served as prime minister of Turkey from 2003 to
2014 at which he became president. He is the 12th president of Turkey.

27
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The increasing role of Islam in Turkish life in the 1980s and ’90s, paved the way for Mr.
Gul and Mr. Erdogan to form the AKP as a democratic, conservative, non-confessional
movement. Unlike its predecessors, the AKP did not center its image on an Islamic identity;
indeed, its leaders underscored that it was not an Islamist party and emphasized that its focus was
democratization, not the politicization of religion. Nevertheless, the political roots of the AKP
and its leadership, some of the party’s political endeavors (including proposed regulation of the
display and advertisement of alcohol), and the head scarves worn by some AKP leaders’
wife’s—including Emine Erdoğan (Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s wife) and Hayrünnisa Gül
(Abdullah Gul’s Wife)—meant that the AKP was viewed as Islamist Party.

The AKP conducted a new era in Turkish politics since they came to the power in 2002.
“The AKP’s worldview is influenced by two elements simultaneously – Islam and liberalismcreating a powerful synthesis.”28 The AKP emerged out of the pro-Islamic political background
and formed a majority party for the first time. The AKP was established with a focus on
democracy and human rights values. “New legislation was adopted that would not normally be
expected from a party that was being described as Islamist. This new legislation in areas such as
privatization, promotion of foreign investment, human rights, and democracy was in line with
both the infrastructure and superstructure of globalization.”29 Moreover, AKP has made
reference to Islamic norms and values to mobilize broader political support for democratic
legitimacy. The AKP drew significant support from non-secular Turkish citizens in the general
elections of 2002 and came to power in Turkey.

28
29
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The AKP has adapted a new Turkish foreign policy. “The AKP embraced political
liberalism, even though it was based in conservative’s towns (the Anatolian bourgeoisie) and had
its root in the Welfare Party, an Islamist party.”30 The AKP's strategy to achieve political
legitimacy in the domestic realm has been accompanied by a new foreign policy. Since in power,
the AKP actively pushed through the reform packages called for by the European Union (EU).
Furthermore, the AKP has introduced multidimensional foreign policies that, today, Ankara
pursues. The multidimensional aspect of the foreign policy has focused primarily on neighboring
countries and regions. “One dimension of this new foreign policy approach concerned relations
with the East, particularly the Middle East, concerns were raised about a so-called “axis shift” in
Turkish foreign policy. This led to a debate as to whether Turkey is shifting its axis by turning
away from the West and gradually turning towards the Middle East.”31 The leadership of the
AKP - under Abdullah Gul, Ahmet Davutoglu and Recep Tayyip Erdogan - demonstrates a
renewed zeal for involvement in the affairs of the Middle East, the Balkans, Caucasus and
Central Asia. AKP’s successive electoral victories under Mr. Erdogan and Mr. Gul in the 2002,
2007, and 2011 national elections show the extent to which his conservative modernity has been
accepted with a new sense of Turkey's standing in the geopolitics of the 21st century.32 Using the
Islamist discourse, this influential policy advances a new vision of Turkey as playing a decisive
role as a participant in an emerging multi-dimensional world order.33 Islamism indicates the
tradition and inspiration of political ideas in the Arab world. Turkey’s notion of historical
identity is that interconnected to its foreign policy. Thus, the Ottomanism has been taking center
stage in contemporary Turkish foreign policy and public diplomacy.
30
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Ahmet Davutoglu had been the architect of the AKP government’s foreign policy since
his nomination as chief adviser to Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan in 2002 and as
ambassador in 2003. In 2009, he became the foreign minister and put into practice the doctrine –
strategic Depth- for Turkey’s engagement with the world in the new millennium.34 The main
thesis of Davutoglu’s theory, as he described it in his book ‘Strategic Depth’ is that a nation’s
value in world politics is predicated on its geo-strategic location and historic depth. Based on this
theory, Turkey is uniquely endowed with both because of its location in geopolitical areas of
influence, particularly its control of the Bosporus, and its historical legacy of the Ottoman
Empire. Davutoglu emphasizes Turkey’s connections to the Balkans, the Middle East and even
Central Asia and argues that Turkey is the natural heir to the Ottoman Empire that once unified
the Muslim world and therefore has the potential to become a Muslim regional power. NeoOttomanism, as manifested in the ‘Strategic Depth’ doctrine, has become a significant feature of
Turkish foreign policy.35 As a result of this change in Turkish foreign policy, Turkey's widening
strategic foreign policy has focused on not only the traditional alliance with Europe but also with
the Middle East and Africa. Since 2002, Turkey has increased diplomatic engagements with the
Middle East and Africa in order to expand of the boundaries of Turkish foreign policy.
As Mr. Erdogan has stated, "Turkey's geopolitical position, rich historical heritage,
cultural depth, well-educated young population, ever-strengthening democracy, growing
economy, and constructive foreign policy make it an indispensable country in a world
transformed by rapid globalization."36 Over the past few years, Ankara has established close ties
with the Muslim world. This new activism is an important departure from previous Turkish
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foreign policy.37 Turkey's recent focus on the Middle East, however, does not mean that Turkey
is about to turn its back on the West. Nor is the shift evidence of the "creeping Islamization" of
Turkish foreign policy.38 Under AKP foreign policy, Turkey is rediscovering the region of which
it has historically been an integral part. Additionally, it is important for Turkish foreign policy to
continue with the necessary reforms that have been stalled for the past two years and proceed
without delay to implement its commitments towards the EU.
According to Abdullah Gul in 2004, Turkey’s role in changing the Middle East
environment is a function of what it represents in this volatile geography as a European,
democratic, and secular country that is attached firmly to the principles of a free-market
economy and has a valuable and unique experience in implementing reform, modernity, and
regional cooperation. Turkey's posture in the Middle East is now composed of becoming a
regional leader, regional protector, bridge, model, and mediator and taking on a liberalizing
role.39 This new vision for the justification of global politics and the new outlook of Turkish
foreign policy, under the AKP administration, has propelled Turkey into the heart of regional
politics in the Middle East, the Balkans and Africa.40

CHAPTER IV
Turkey - EU Relations: A Journey without an Arrival!

In this chapter, I analyze Turkey’s unresolved full membership relationship with the
European Union (EU) under the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi,
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AKP) government since 2002. Turkey is a member of the Council of Europe since the Council
was founded in May 1949. Turkey’s journey to join the European Economic Community (EEC)
began with its associate membership application to the ECC in July 1959, following the
establishment of the ECC in 1958. The Ankara Association Agreement was signed in 1963
between the Republic of Turkey and the ECC with the aim toward the accession of Turkey into
the EEC. Turkey is the longest standing applicant to the EU with many ups and downs during an
unsettled negotiation process.
Turkey applied for full membership to the European Community (EC) in April 1987,
which was replaced by the EU in 1992. Turkey is the only candidate state that has not yet begun
accession negotiations. Enduring obstacles with additional protocols and the EU’s unfulfilled
political expectations prolonged Turkey’s full membership in the EU. Besides the slow moving
process membership, Turkey still remains without a clear timetable for EU accession. “In all the
other countries, the political and economic process accelerated as the EU provided clearer signals
to their accession. In the Turkish context, it has not been easy to sustain the political and
economic process given the ambivalent, slow track relationship with the EU.”41 This long and
tiring journey has caused Turkey to rethink the EU accession process.
In recent years, numerous theories have emerged regarding Turkey’s modern foreign
policy toward the West, particularly the European Union (EU), for example it has been referred
to as: ‘axis of shift’ and ‘Turkey is turning its face away from EU’ and ‘does Christian Europe
accept Muslim Turkey into the European Union?.’ Contrary to the arguments that Turkey has
begun to move away from the West and the EU under the AKP governments since 2002, this
thesis asserts that Turkey has not moved away from the EU and the West but is simply
41
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rediscovering the East. Although the EU negotiation process slowed down, Turkey remains
committed to the objective of EU accession while it has improved relations in the East, with both
Muslim and non-Muslim states. Turkey does not dispute the constitutive norms of the Westerncentric international environment, yet it trying to help fix the existing system in such a way as to
much better reflect its concerns and priorities at home and abroad.42
Europeans question the suitability of Turkey’s accession to the EU. However, Turkey’s
membership in the EU has been challenged by the European states for decades. In this regard,
Turks view the Middle East as an alternative strategic destination rather than Turkey perpetually
knocking on the EU’s door and seeks a desire for a leadership in the Middle East. “Turkey no
longer indexes its policies solely to the wishes of its western partners, as it has increasingly
become clearer that Turkey’s concerns over its territorial integrity.”43 In response to that, the
Turkish government under AKP, adopted the ‘Turkey-centric view’ approach to cope with these
challenges. The Turkey-centric approach is an important factor in highlighting Turkey’s needs to
transform to consideration of the liberal-democratic norms of the EU. Yet Turkish decisionmakers simultaneously underline that Turkey should be in the driver’s seat of this transformation
and should adjust the pace and intensity of such reforms according to its ability to digest them.
In 1997, Turkey was not given candidate status at the Luxemburg Summit, when the
Central and Eastern European countries along with Cyprus and Malta were given candidate
status. While the EU started negotiations with some of these countries, Turkey was not put on the
list of candidate countries, which led to question about the role of cultural identity in relations
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between Turkey and the EU.44 Is the EU a Christian Club? Does Turkey’s future belong in
Europe or in the Middle East? “Are the West’s ‘globalized’ values in fact western rather than
universal, and rooted in specifically western culture and historical evolution – its Christian roots,
or the Renaissance, for example?”45 Some Europeans worry that bringing a large Muslim
Turkey, a nation of nearly 77 million Muslims, formally into Europe will compromise the
continent’s Christian character and heritage. Increasingly, it is believed that the EU will never
open its door to a large Muslim country like theirs, and Turks are tired of reforming ‘for
Europe’s sake.’46 After September 11, the concept of civilization has become more religious,
while previously it was more cultural and historic.47
After September 11, there has been a rising tension between the West and the Muslim
world and there has been increasing Islamophobia in Western society.48 Europeans worry that
Islam will make it difficult for Muslims to accept many of the continent’s secular core values,
such as tolerance, democracy and equal rights for women. European decision makers give
reference to God or Christianity from the EU Constitution, which demonstrates that the continent
has a strong Christian bias. Vatican opposed Turkish membership in the EU under Pope Benedict
XVI. However, perhaps, the new Pope Francis is more open minded, although his statement
about the ‘alleged’ Armenian genocide issue caused tension in Ankara. “The pope condemned
the 1915 killings of Armenians by Turks as genocide – comments that drew the anger of Ankara
– but urged reconciliation with Turkey, as well as with neighboring Azerbaijan.”49 Francis urged
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both Armenia and Turkey to lay aside their differences and strive to be peacemakers. Pope
Francis said: "Cherish the great wisdom of your elders and strive to be peacemakers: not content
with the status quo, but actively engaged in building the culture of encounter and
reconciliation."50
For many, such as Sarkozy, Turkey’s efforts to promote peace in the Middle East
may be praiseworthy but do not constitute a reason to back Turkey’s EU
membership. Muslim countries may be inclined to listen to Ankara more than
Brussels in view of the cultural, historical, and religious bonds tying Turkey to the
Middle East, but this proves only that Turkey can be a useful ally rather than
member of the EU.51
Pope Benedict XVI, while he was still Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, called EU
negotiations with Turkey ‘an enormous mistake.’ The EU was founded by
Christian Democrats like Konrad Adenauer, Robert Schuman and Jean Monnet,
and many of their heirs still see it as a “Christian Club.” That image would be
much harder to maintain if the club’s biggest member were a Muslim state. Many
would agree that the European Union is in fact a Christian club – if by “Christian”
we mean a culture profoundly shaped by Christian, and particularly Roman
Catholic, ideas and practices. Others freely admit that the divide between the EU
and Turkey is in fact a cultural gap – one large enough for former French
President Valerie Giscard d’Estaing to state that “Turkey is not a European
country,” EU Commissioner Frits Bolkestein to warn of the coming Islamization
of Europe and Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi to assert “the superiority
of [European] civilization” over that of “Islamic countries.” For these and other
European leaders, culture matters and Turkey is simply forcing Europe to realize
it. 52
Turkish foreign policy under the AKP government is in favor of full membership
in the EU, although there have been many challenges and setbacks in its journey for full
membership. The growing rift between Turkey and the EU is best illustrated by the
words of Turkey’s Minister of State and Chief Negotiator for the EU, Egemen Bagis. He
said that “the EU is today under the risk of being overtaken by a racist mentality that
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cannot internalize its own values and emulates the fascist methods of the 1930s.”53 The
long negotiation process has caused reluctance by Turkish government. But, the
prominent figures of the AKP have reaffirmed several times that EU membership has
been maintained as a priority of Turkish foreign policy.54 On June 22nd, 2016, Turkish
President Erdogan said; “Europe, you don’t want us –Turkey- because the majority of our
population are Muslim…we knew it but we tried to show our sincerity.” 55 Joining the EU
is not just a Turkish foreign policy but it is about identity and perceptions. The reshaping
of the world in recent years seems to place the EU and Turkey in different camps.
Turkey’s full Cyprus membership negotiation process continues with challenges
and the EU’s ambivalent approach. There are also issues regarding Cyprus and TurkishArmenian relations and the EU-Turkey Refugee Pact (known as refuges deal). This refers
to visa-free travel for Turks in the EU in exchange for a refugee deal over Iraqi and
Syrian refugees going through Turkey to the EU. The fact is that despite Turkey’s
overtures, the two neighborhood questions that lie close to the heart and political
dynamics of Turkey’s accession process – Cyprus and Armenia- remain unsolved.

1. Turkey-Cyprus and the EU
The Cyprus conflict represented the single most important issue in Turkey’s EU
accession process with the start of negotiations on October 3, 2005. 56 The decades old
conflict in Cyprus and Greek-Turkish disputes in the Aegean Sea have long represented
an obstacle to Turkey’s European integration. An analysis of the negotiations from 2005
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was published in the Brussel’s Summit on December 17, 2008. “In this declaration, the
EU stated that the UN Secretary’s General was pleased with the Turkish contribution to
the efforts to solve the Cyprus issue. However, the Council, along with the Commission
on behalf of 25 states, called Turkey to complete the negotiations to adapt the Ankara
agreement, establishing an association between the European Economic Community and
Turkey.”57
After this declaration in 2008, Turkey’s relationship with the EU became more
complicated than ever. In this complexity, the EU presented itself as a party to the Cyprus issue
and made it unsolvable, although the EU was supposed to assume a moderating and unbiased
role in its solution. Furthermore, Turkey cannot be a member of the EU until it recognizes all of
Cyprus – both the Northern, Turkish Cypriot and the Southern, Greek Cypriot -, pursuant to
international law and agreements to which Turkey is a signatory.
The Turkish Cypriot community has a legal right to negotiate from a status of
equality with the Greek Cypriot community in the current attempt, under the
auspices of the Secretary-General, to reach a workable political solution for the
unfortunate situation in Cyprus. The Greek Cypriot has never had the right to
assert sovereignty over the Turkish Cypriot people without their consent. Nor,
from the moment of the Greek Cypriot unilaterally rejected the constitutional
basis on which the legitimacy of the Cypriot government rested in international
law, has the Greek Cypriot regime has any right to assert sovereignty over the
island. Since that time practical necessity has created two governments on
Cyprus. The rights of the peoples of the two communities to determine their own
political futures have remained unchanged and in all are equal. The Security
Council and General Assembly of the United Nations (UN) have recognized and
consistently reaffirmed these rights, as have the two communities themselves in
their interim negotiated agreements. Under these circumstances, international law
does not sanction differential treatment of the two communities in the current
negotiations or in any resulting settlement. If these efforts to establish a federal
government of Cyprus - with equal participation and mutual acceptance of the two
community should fail, each regime the Turkish Cypriot no less than the Greek
Cypriot would be eligible for recognition as an independent state. Such
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recognition by other states would not then infringe any principle of international
law.58
When the EU included Cyprus in its enlargement policy, the conflict escalated the
dynamics of Turkey’s own accession process. The entry of the Republic of Cyprus into the EU
in 2004 has poisoned EU-Turkey relations to an unprecedented extent. Thus, this complicated
decision by the EU, blocked the way to a solution rather than contributing to the settlement of the
Cyprus issue. The Republic of Cyprus has vetoed half a dozen chapters in Turkey’s accession
negotiations. A further eight chapters have been frozen by the EU because of Turkey’s nonimplementation of the additional protocol extending the EU-Turkey customs union agreement to
Cyprus. Thus, a solution in Cyprus has become a condition for Turkey’s EU membership.
“Greek Cypriot tactics to block both Turkey’s accession talks and the commission’s direct trade
regulation to lift the isolation of northern Cyprus are considered to be evidence that EU should
have never accepted Cyprus’ EU membership prior to resolution of the conflict.”59 Moreover,
France has insisted on a ‘privileged partnership’ status for Turkey and it has blocked the opening
of five titles on the grounds that they were directly related to membership.60 The negotiation
process has slowed down increasingly because of these obstacles.

2. Turkey-Armenia and the EU
Another challenge in the EU accession process is Turkey’s relationship with Armenia.
Historically, since the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, Turkish-Armenian relations have been
tense because of the so-called Armenian genocide of 1915. Armenia has close relations with the
EU because of the ‘European Neighborhood Policy (ENP).’ Moreover, the Armenian Diaspora
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has extensive power and influence in the EU and the United States (USA). For instance, The
Armenian Diaspora has made a great effort to have the U.S. Congress recognize the alleged
Armenian Genocide. Furthermore, some of the EU states already recognized the ‘alleged’
Armenian-genocide issue. Therefore, recognition of the Armenian genocide increased contention
between Turkey and several EU member states, including France, Italy, Greece, Belgium, and
Sweden. The German parliament recognized the alleged Armenian genocide on June 2, 2016.
Moreover, Pope Francis called the killings a genocide last year.61 The European parliament
recognized the Armenian genocide in resolutions in 1987, 2000, 2002, and 2005, complicating
Turkey’s relations with EU institutions.62 The member states of the EU, the U.S. and other
countries put enormous pressure on the matter by recognizing the alleged Armenian genocide
rather than encouraging the building of a strong relationship between Turkey and Armenia.
Since the AKP came in power in 2002, there has been improvement in Turkish-Armenian
relations. Former president Abdullah Gul made a landmark visit to Armenia regarding ‘promises
of hope for the future.’ This was the first time in the two nation’s history that a Turkish leader
visited the country, following Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan’s invitation to attend the
soccer match.63 Mr. Sargsyan said Armenia and Turkey would work together to solve regional
conflicts, “we are going to resolve the issues and not pass them on to next generations.”64
Turkey’s effort showed great improvement with Armenia and Turkey’s neighbors. Therefore, the
Armenian genocide should be considered a foreign policy issue between the two nations rather
than being focus of the EU and others.

3. Turkey – ‘Refugee Deal’ and the EU
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In 2016, the current issue, regarding Turkey’s full membership in the EU is about the
refugee deal which is an accord between the EU and the Turkish government that went into
effect in March 2015. The EU offered Turkey a deal for cooperation in stemming the flow of
migrants to Greece and to the EU. Under the deal, Greece can send migrants back to Turkey and
Turkey agreed to stop more boats and the flow of migrants to Europe. In exchange, the EU
pledged 3 billion euros ($3.2 billion as of October, 2016) in aid to refugees in Turkey and agreed
to resettle more Syrians refugees and speed up visa liberalization for Turks and Turkey’s
membership in the EU. Turkey is currently home to about three millions Syrian refugees.65
Hundreds of thousands of these refugees would flow to Europe if Turkey did not prevent them
from traveling to Europe. The President of Turkey, Mr. Erdogan, made clear that Turkey has
taken in 3 million refugees, whereas the EU’s only concern is keeping them out of its territory.
Ankara sees that the visa-free deal reached between Turkey and the EU would be perceived as a
first step toward eventual Turkish membership in the EU.
Turkey’s Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu said the deal with the EU stipulated that all
Turks would get visa freedom in October 2016, “It can’t be that we – Ankara- implement
everything that is good for the EU but Turkey gets nothing in return.”66 Yet, most of the key
provisions of the deal were barely implemented. The EU launched an aid program of more than
$375 million, targeting a million of the neediest Syrians in Turkey giving them the debit cards,
called the Kizilay card (Turkish ‘Red Crescent’). Recipients of the cards are being chosen based
on need, according to the EU Humanitarian Aid Commissioner Christos Stylianides.67 Sarvepalli
Radhakrishnan, an Indian philosopher and statesman, - the president of Indian from 1962 to
1967- explained the realpolitik principle with the analogy “it is good when I steal your cow, and
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bad when you steal my cow which has been the governing force of European relations for all
these four or five centuries. Self-interest is the end; brute-force, the means; conscience is
taboo.”68
Hans J. Morgenthau argued that interest is at the heart of all politics and thus on
the international stage it behooved each state to pursue its national interest,
generally defined as power. The national interest as their attainment is necessary
for the nation’s survival. The animus dominandi, the desire to dominate, is the
social force that determines political activity. On the international plane, those
behavioral patterns translate into policies of the status quo, imperialism, and
prestige. The first has as its objective the maintenance of the existing balance of
power, whereas the second seeks to acquire more power and the third seeks to
show off strength in order to keep or expand power. Remember always that it is
not only a political necessity, but also a moral duty for a nation to always follow
in its dealings with other nations but one guiding star, one standard for thought,
one rule for action: The National Interest. Consequently, the necessary elements
of the national interest have a tendency to swallow up the variable elements so
that in the end all kinds of objectives, actual or potential, are justified in terms of
national survival.69
Turkey’s long time ambitions to join the EU has been encouraged by the latest Syrian
migrants deal. However, this deal has been delayed because of a dispute over Turkish antiterrorism legislation. European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker emphasizes that if all
the conditions are fulfilled, Turkey can win visa-free travel to the EU. While big declines in
refugee numbers followed the Turkey pact -refugee deal, - the EU toughened its rhetoric on
Turkey’s membership prospect. Meanwhile, Turkey is facing multiple serious national security
threats which include the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIS or ISIL) presence in neighboring
Syria and other terrorist organization such as Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), are issues in
Turkey’s mainly Kurdish southeast. Turkey launched its biggest military operation in Syria on
August 24, 2016 aiming to force ISIS away from its borders and deter further advances by Syrian
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Kurds allied with PKK and some other terrorists’ organizations. Moreover, Ankara declared a
three-month state of emergency. Therefore, Ankara cannot soften and adjust its anti-terrorism
law at this point in time because of the national security situations in the country simply be
request from Brussels. National interests are paramount when it is the concern of the country’s
national security. “Statecraft, as its name suggests, is nothing more than the art of success,
applied to the specific ends of the state.”70
The EU leaders turned to Ankara for help after almost a million people flowed into
Greece in 2015. In late July, 2016, Ankara made a statement that Turkey could back out of its
agreement with the EU if it does not receive visa-free travel for its citizens by October. However,
there is no sign of reaching the agreement between Brussels and Ankara about the visa
liberalization deal and the deal is not off the table yet either. Ibrahim Kalin, the spokesperson for
the Turkish President, Mr. Erdogan, complained what is clear is that the EU gave Turkey the
cold shoulder regarding the Turkey- EU migration deal. The EU risks alienating a major ally
while the EU membership remains s strategic goal for Turkey; it takes two to tango.71 Brussel’s
cooperation with Ankara can make substantial progress on Turkey’s full membership in the EU.
Therefore, both Turkey and the EU could continue benefiting from working together as major
allies.
Turkey balances its relations with the EU by strengthening its relations with non-Western
actors whenever this is considered to be in Turkey’s national interests. Under the ruling AKP,
Turkey is adopting a free-market economy and liberal democracy on one hand and fostering
interdependent relations with the EU on the other hand. The AKP has maintained considerable
economic growth with the EU in the past decade. In 2015, Turkey was the European Union’s
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fourth-largest export market and sixth-largest source of imports.72 Greater wealth provides future
investment opportunities in both directions. Thus, the Western world and Turkey are strategically
intertwined in economic success. A more prosperous Turkey is likely to remain stable in the
region and anchored to the West as a reliable and supportive ally to reinforce the Turkish-EU
bonds. In 2011, The AKP has set 2023 goals and Mr. Erdogan announced the ‘2023 Visions’
consisting of specific economic goals leading up to the country’s centennial in 2023. Mr.
Erdogan’s vision outlines targets and major improvement in the areas of economic activity,
energy, health care and transport as well as democratic reforms. At the G-20 Antalya Summit,
Turkey was able to provide concrete frameworks for public-private cooperation for investing in
financial and developmental efforts. Turkey was successful in mainstreaming the Sustainable
Development Goals (SDGs) in all activities throughout its G-20 presidency.73 According to this
vision, Turkey is becoming an advanced economy by 2023- an economic powerhouse – the
world’s 10th largest economy.74
Turkey, under AKP government, has begun to pursue a transformative foreign policy in
its region whose fundamental premises are to contribute to regional integration and
interdependence. Turkey’s location explains its own historic importance, between Europe and
the Asia –Middle East, the Turkic world and the Ottoman region. Therefore, Turkey’s culturally,
historically, economically and politically links to these diverse worlds’ forms its foreign policy
for these regions. In the same vein, similar to China’s ‘peaceful rise / peaceful development’
strategy, Turkey tries to contribute to the emergence of a friendly regional environment through
the adoption of soft-power tools.75 Turkey plays a crucial role in linking the EU to wider areas of

72

https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/reports/2016/07/20/141568/turkeys-path-to-prosperity-in-2023/
http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/analysis/151202-kayagil.html
74
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/reports/2016/07/20/141568/turkeys-path-to-prosperity-in-2023/
75
Oguzlu, 998
73

33

Eurasia. “Turkish government has been telling the EU that it cannot hope to have a credible
policy in the Middle East without Turkey on board. Turkey has all the tools necessary to
guarantee the EU a greater presence in the region – an European goal since the foundation of its
common Foreign and security policy.”76 Turkey has a strategic location between the West and
Asia. If Turkey is to be a full member of the EU, this would facilitate more cooperative relations
in the regions for both the EU and Turkey.

Conclusion
Turkey has aimed at becoming a member of the EU since 1963. However, the EU was
reluctant to accept Turkey’s EU membership under a different pretext in every period during the
EU accession process. Turkish governing elites generally considered Turkey as being within
European borders culturally and accept ‘European values’ as the basic criteria for the
civilization.77 From this point of view, is the EU willing to admit Turkey into the European club?
Turkey’s accession to join the EU involves many obstacles and many of them are not directly
related to EU membership. The EU should play an advisory role particularly in Cyprus and
Armenian issues rather than as a third actor in the process. Germany and France took a negative
stance toward Turkey’s membership to the EU. France under Sarkozy questioned Turkey’s
credentials - the idea that Turkey did not belong in Europe - for becoming even a member of the
EU. Moreover, some of the EU member states question the full membership of Turkey, whose
population is almost entirely Muslim, because of cultural and religious identity. The best remedy
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is inclusivity of Turkey’s full membership to the EU. The AKP is not shifting Turkish Foreign
policy from the West to the East. Turkey is simply expanding its foreign policy.78
The EU is increasingly being perceived as an inward looking continent on decline, which
is becoming xenophobic and defensive.79 Following the end of the Cold War, the former socialist
East European countries had started to pursue ‘a return to Europe’ policy and this major shift in
international politics changed the EU’s priorities and the significance of Turkey’s geostrategic
role for the EU. Turkey’s traditional role in the Cold War era disappeared, and the EU started to
increasingly engage with the newly independent East European states.80 However, as a major
country in the midst of the Afro-Eurasia landmass, Turkey is a central country with multiple
regional identities that cannot be reduced to one, unified category.
Turkey’s inclusion in the EU would give strategic support to European states to lessen
tensions in the current Middle East, particularly the Syrian and Iraqi refugee situations. In this
context, Turkey could host, employ and ultimately – if necessary- absorb its swelling Syrian
refugee population, making Turkey a more resilient country in its own right and a stronger
neighbor and partner for Europe.81 For the first time, Turkey began to use soft power in foreign
policy tools such as economics, human rights, identity, dialogue and civil administration as
opposed to the hard power instruments such as military.82 More to the point: to have one of the
world’s most important Muslim states anchored in Europe as a wealthy, tolerant democracy, and
bordering states like Iraq, Syria and Iran, would send effective message to the rest of the Islamic
world.
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Since the EU rebuffed Turkey’s application in 1989, the governing leaders, at the time,
were unable to obtain a clear EU membership path for Turkey. If the EU had provided more
incentives and encouragements for Turkey’s full membership, Turkish leaders, led by Turgut
Ozal at that time, might have implemented more political reforms that might have changed the
nature of the current relations between the EU and Turkey a long time ago. When the AKP
started to govern Turkey, since 2002, the pace of reforms accelerated significantly and as a
result, Turkey was able to make a number of constitutional amendments and administrative
improvements. Turkish foreign policy has displayed a major transformation since the EU entered
a slowdown in the membership process in 2005 and 2006. The EU placed more emphasis on
sanctions and setbacks in its approach to Turkey – sticks more than carrots - and implemented a
confrontational style rather than conciliatory one.83 The AKP government has not changed
previous Turkish foreign policies toward the EU. However, it is clear that AKP has increased its
efforts to deepen Turkey’s relations with the EU. In this context, the latest ‘refugee deal’ Pact between Turkey and the EU - is proof of improvement to seek another opportunity to gain a full
membership status in the EU.
De facto, Turkey is a European country for centuries anyway, whether Turkey is
officially become a full member status in the EU or not. Turkey is a ‘founding’ member of the
Council of Europe, a member of the EU, Customs Union, member of European Court of Human
Rights (ECtHR), member of UEFA -the Union of European Football Associations and the
governing body of football in Europe and there are many international treaties along with high
volume of trade partnership between Turkey and the EU. Turkey is more European than most
people in Europe in terms of the kinds of attire of people, the cultural offerings, economic
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developments and commercialization on the high streets. Many European institutions and events
include Turkey in their scope. For example, Turkey won Eurovision in 2003, Istanbul was
European Capital of Culture in 2010 and European Capital of Sports for 2012. I believe Turkey's
European credentials outweigh its non-European qualities.
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CHAPTER V
Turkey’s Engagement with Middle East and Turkic States:
Ottomanism and Islamic Identity

In this chapter, I analyze the historical continuities and changes in Turkey’s foreign
policy engagement with the Middle East and Turkic states. I highlight the correlation between
the Turkish foreign policy and Ottoman - Islamic identity, under the Ottoman Empire people –
the millet – system. The Ottoman Empire’s social structure – the millet system - was based on the
religious and cultural autonomy of different communities rather than particular ethnic groups and
languages. Each millet was recognized as a legal community under its own religious leadership.
“The Ottoman Empire spread itself across three continents and included Turkey, Transylvania,
Transcaucasia and Caucasus, the Crimea, southern Ukraine, the countries that now make up the
states of Romania, Serbia, Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Lebanon, a part of Iraq,
Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Egypt, Cyrenaica and Tripolitania, Tunisia and Algeria. There were at
least 36 different races of people and three major religious groups; Muslims, Jews and Christians
lived within the empire.”84 Although non-Muslims enjoyed the religious freedoms within the
millet system, they were confined to certain boundaries and were subject to pool taxes.85 Loyalty
was a major dynamic behind the Ottoman state system.
The Ottoman Sultan, the Caliph, -the successor of the prophet Mohammed - was accepted
as the head of the Muslims – a worldwide Islamic community known as Ummah. Ottomanism
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aimed to provide equal rights and duties, including freedom of thought and faith, to both
Muslims and non-Muslims, thus creating an Ottoman nation in order to preserve the empire’s
unity.86 Within this context, I examine the relevance of Turkey’s unique experience for Arab
successor states of the Ottoman Empire in the contemporary Middle East and Turkic states. The
emergence of Turkish consciousness paved the way for the notion of being a Turk as compatible
with the concepts of Ottomanism and Islam. Foreign policy becomes as efficient tool for
constructing a national identity of a state.87
There were huge territories in the Middle East and the Balkans ruled by the Ottoman
Empire for centuries. The Political legitimacy of the Ottoman state was based on its ability to
defend the ummah and maintain its welfare within the territory of Islam. The Ottoman Sultan
was associated with being God’s loyal servant and this territory was anchored to the life-giving
homeland.88 Therefore, Turkey has a special geographic location and geopolitical status in
between the East and the West. According to the Koran, all Muslims comprise a single
community –ummah- : “Verily, this ummah of yours is a single ummah, and I am your lord and
cherisher: therefore, serve me.”89 Islamic political perception is associated with the unity of
ummah rather than ethnic and racial differences. Ahmet Davutoglu,90 suggests in his published
books that Islamic identity is ontological rather than social. Davutoglu states, “the oneness of
ummah depends on the common ontological approach of its members rather than on linguistic,
geographic, cultural or biological factors and is directly connected to the concept of Allah and to
86
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the specific image originating from this belief in tawhid.”91 Loyalty to the Ottoman Empire was
considered a part of the Muslim faith and culture. This perception was used by both elites and
intellectuals to establish a firm foundation for the ideology of Ottomanism.92 The following map
illustrates the last remnants of the Ottoman Empire in the years before the foundation of the
modern Republic of Turkey.

Map 1.93 1920 National Pact – Misak-i Milli- designated territories (Figure 1 - map a -) for a
Turkish nation, 1914-1920. Conceptual map based on the claims of the Misak-i Milli with known
territorial borders from 1914,1918, 1920 and even 1878 (Batumi).

The National Pact of Turkey – Misak-i Milli- was announced by the last term of
the Ottoman Parliament in 1920, with some major exceptions, such as Western
91
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Thrace and districts of Mosul and Iskenderun. In contrast to Germany, Austria,
Hungary and Bulgaria who lost World War I and accepted the agreements
enforced by the Entente Powers. The Turkish nationalists waged a war against the
implementation of the Serves Treaty. Furthermore, Turkish nationalists’ refusal to
accept territorial losses in Anatolia94and their signing of a new peace treaty as a
result of a military victory in the National Liberation War was the crucial
difference between Turkey and the Middle Eastern states, which gained their
independence without a major military confrontation in the boundaries drawn by
colonial powers. This distinctive feature had a major impact on the politics of
Turkey and its foreign policy.95

The Republic of Turkey was established and its borders were recognized as a result of
signing the Treaty of Lausanne on July 24th, 1923. Turkey’s involvement in the Middle East and
its influence in the region based on Turkey’s historic role stems from the legacy of the Ottoman
Empire. Mr. Erdogan routinely references Ottomans, the Seljuks, a Turkic group that preceded
the Ottomans in the Middle East, and also pre-Islamic Turkic peoples like Gokturks, Avars, and
Karakhanids.96 More recently, the President of Turkey, Mr. Erdogan higlighted Turkey’s
historical connection with the issue of Mosul, referring to Turkey’s military campaign in the
liberation of Mosul, which Turkey has insisted on playing a role in the battle to retake Mosul
from the Islamic State, a terrorist organization ( ISIS, ISIL or DAESH). The battle for Mosul’s
liberation started on Monday, October 17th, 2016. Mosul is Iraq’s second-largest city. ISIS seized
it more than two years ago.97 President Erdogan said “when Western powers divided the former
Ottoman lands of the Middle East, at the end of the World War I, we –Turkey- did not
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voluntarily accept the borders of our country” and Mr. Erdogan also referred to the last Ottoman
Parliament, Mosul as part of Turkey.98
Mustafa Akgun, the director of the Global Political Trends Center in Turkey, said that for
Turks “there is an emotional side to the issue, referring to Mosul, a century ago, that place was
Turkey. A big geography was Turkey. It is committed in the memories that British and French
imperialism was responsible.”99 Furthermore, Mr. Erdogan criticized the Treaty of Lausanne,
which created the borders of the modern Republic of Turkey, for leaving the country too small.
He spoke of the country’s interest in the fate of Turkish minorities living beyond these borders,
as well as historic claims to Mosul.100 “We [Turkey] have a historical responsibility in the
region. Our most important task is to teach this to a new generation. If we want to be both at the
table and in the field, there is a reason.”101 Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the founder of Republic of
Turkey, said that the ‘national border’ did not refer only to Turks: “During the demarcation and
fixing of the borders, we claimed that our national border runs to the south of Iskenderun, and
includes Mosul, Kirkuk, and Sulaymaniyah by extending to the East. This is our national frontier
line.”102 The following map illustrates the curerent border of the country, where the orange
segments represent the revised borders of Turkey under Misak-i Milli pact (1920).
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Map 2.103 1920 National Pact – Misak-i Milli- designated territories (Figure 2- map b-) for
Republic of Turkey, 2016.

Nicholas Spykman’s theory of Rimland explains the importance of geography.
Geopolitics is the planning of the security policy of a country in terms of its geographical factors.
His view is, “who controls the Rimland rules Eurasia, who rules Eurasia controls the destinies of
the world.”104 Turkey is centered in a strategically critical and important region; its geography is
an inescapable reality for Turkey and unchanging factor in international relations. The demand
for Turkey to regain its former geography has remained the same for centuries. Thus, Turkey’s
strategic value of its position determines its foreign policy and security decisions. “In a world of
international anarchy, foreign policy must aim at least the preservation of the relative power
103
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position of the state. Power is in the last instance the ability to wage successful war, and in
geography lie the clues to the problems of military and political strategy.”105 William Hale
argues that for a state of its size and strength, Turkey had to deal with an extraordinary range of
international questions, mainly due to its geopolitical location.
Islamic political identity also provides a cognitive bridge between interest and action,
society and state, and tradition and modernity in much of the Islamic world.106 Politically active
Muslims in Turkey evoked Islamic symbols, discourse and institutions to express their notions of
community and identity. They utilized Islam in Turkey to promoted new understanding for the
cultural order, especially through the participation in social movements and related political
parties. This new culture with the themes of equality, justice, identity and solidarity became the
center for the Islamic oriented movements. Islam facilitates participation in social life and serves
as a source of solidarity. Islam has such popular appeal because of the effectiveness of Islamic
leaders and networks in mobilizing large sections of the populace in pursuit of social justice and
political representation.
The relationship between Islam, nationalism and the Islamic tradition influenced the
Islamic movements for Islamic political identity. Islam is a religion that seeks unity without
negating differences for all diversity. There are not big differences in lifestyles within the
Muslim world other than the national differences. Islam lies at the core structure of both Ottoman
and Turkish society and it is the main source of shared moral values and understandings.
“Islamic political identity is in the process of becoming conscious of the social and political
effects of religiously molded frames of reference, and utilizing these frames as political means
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for fulfilling worldly agenda. This transformation entails the strategic and conscious utilization
of shared conceptions of ethics, justice, community and history to develop new methods for
advancing tangible social and economic goals.”107 In this context, it is an inevitable reality that
Turkey’s Ottoman heritage provides historical links with the Middle East and Turkic states.
Throughout the Ottoman Empire’s history (1299-1922), religion served as a mediating
cultural and political bridge between the state and society. The Ottoman Empire shared a frame
of reference based on the Quran and the tradition of the Prophet Muhammed, which were used to
define the notions of virtue and justice in society.108 The Ottoman state system was associated
with the Sublime Porte (Bab-i Ali) central government of the Ottoman Empire. The key
institution for the Sublime Porte in the Ottoman state was the child levy (devsirme) whereby the
state raised the boys (ages 8 to 18) to become elites as military and bureaucratic leaders whose
loyalty in theory was to the state and the objective fulfillment of its purpose. The Ottoman state
established its own bureaucratic schools and trained the devsirme – recruited children- to execute
the norms and rules of the state. This system allowed the Ottoman state to rule the Millet system,
which controlled different religious communities by recognizing a large degree of autonomy in
their intercommunal affairs. Thus, Islam was one of the main sources of social cohesion and
important organizing set of norms for the horizontal ties of diverse communities under the Millet
system. The primary task for the bureaucracy, in the Ottoman State system, was the preservation
of the integrity of the Sultan - the state – and the promotion of Islam. Although Islam was an
important part during the Ottoman Empire, the affairs of the Ottoman state were carried out
according to the sovereign’s laws – known as kanun, which were seen as separate from Islamic
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law (sharia). As a result of the kanun, an independent and secular legal system developed,
complementing the sharia and its vision of virtuous and just order in the society.
Islamic consciousness remained as the foundation of communal identity between large
segments of society for centuries. Islam offered a more durable political community for Ottoman
society. The policy of ‘Ottomanism’ was designed to minimize cultural, ethnic and religious
differences within the diverse empire by giving strong legal protection to all groups along with a
feeling of Ottoman citizenship.109 Turkish nationalism that incorporates Islam and Ottoman
history is an essential aspect of modern Turkish national identity. There is a close link among
Turkish national identity, culture and Islam, although Ataturk tried to separate Islam from
Turkish nationalism and establish a secularist Turkish nationalism (known as Kemalism). Islam
as a spiritual and communal influence positioned itself to enlighten some of the core values
among the Muslim World. Thus, Islam became the means of communication and alliance
formation for solidarity.
Necip Fazil Kisakurek110 (1904-1983), the ideological father of Turkish-Islamic synthesis
- began publishing the weekly ‘the Great East’ (Buyuk Dogu) in 1943. This weekly magazine
called for the abolition of secularism and repeatedly praised the Ottoman Sultans. Kisakurek
described the image of Buyuk Dogu – the Great East - as it continues a thorough, integrated faith,
a worldview, and a poem of being’ that culminates in Islam. The essays were published in Buyuk
Dogu magazine, collected under ‘the web of Ideology’ (Ideolocya Orgusu), which symbolizes
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this framework and points to a model which engages the role of faith in public life.111 Since the
late 1970s, Kisakurek has been an icon of Turkish Islamisim. Former president of Turkey,
Abdullah Gul, and the current president of Turkey, Mr. Erdogan, and many readers of the AKP
have been inspired by Kisakurek’s rhetoric. Mr. Erdogan recalled the joys of meeting Kisakurek
and walking ‘the path’ alongside him. Mr. Erdogan described the poet’s life and works as a guide
for himself and future generations.112
Turkish-Islamic identity stemming from the country’s historical experiences in the
Ottoman-Islamic past allows for a role to lead Turkish and Islamic world. In this context, the
Turkish government can pursue a policy of Neo – Ottomanism to have Muslims feel at home,
under a common Islamic identity and instill values for coexistence, regardless of national
differences and geographic locations. Under the AKP, Turkey has legitimized historical
reference has shifted to the Ottoman Empire.113 Abdullah Gul,114 then the Welfare Party’s (Refah
Partisi) which represented the religious idea as a the political expression, vice-chair, defined
‘deeper Turkey’ as a dynamic idea of creating an honorable and powerful Turkey by linking the
Anatolian bourgeoisie, Sufi orders, neighborhood associations and foundations.115 Identity
dominates foreign policy. “Turkey’s Islamic identity has not prevented it from having a close
interaction with the West and from being an important member of the Western institutions and
organizations. We pursue and further develop our integration with the West on the basis of
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mutual interest.”116 Abdullah Gul played a leading role in formulating Welfare Party (RP)’s
foreign policy:
Turkey is neither Luxembourg nor Bangladesh. History, geography and realities
require Turkey to carry and fulfill a mission regardless of our desires. This
mission or role may be the role of the Ottoman Empire. We therefore cannot
remain indifferent to the developments in Palestine, Yugoslavia and Albania due
to our national interest. Turkey is the cultural center of Islamic civilization in
Europe. We [Turkey] therefore have to involve ourselves in the developments in
the Balkans.117

Mr. Erdogan’s identification (he associates himself with the spirit of Adnan Menderes in the
1950s and Turgut Ozal in the 1980s) and constant appeal to Mr. Ozal’s policies resonated in
rejuvenating Mr. Ozal’s legacy and utilize it to promote his new policies. Many Muslims who voted for
the AKP in 2002 made connections with the restoration of the Mr. Ozal’s era. AKP’s identity emerged
simultaneously with Turkish, Muslim and Western beliefs. The AKP government empowers and
promotes the return of Muslims and Islamic ethics to the public sphere. The AKP has its roots in
combining norms and values in Islamic political traditions.118 A survey by Istanbul’s Bosporus
University conducted in late fall 2002, found that 90 percent of AKP voters prayed at least once a day
and 99 percent fasted during the Ramadan. A total of 81 percent saw themselves as Muslim first and
Turks second, while 60 percent said that religious values took precedence over national values,
democracy, human rights and secularism.119 Islam remains an effective power and a strong cultural
reference for the formation of Turkish identity as a Muslim country. “The AKP’s goal is to transform
cultural values in such a way that religion as a political identity is acceptable, rather than to simply
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reduce religion to an ideology.”120 The following quote is part of the Prime Minister Recep Tayyip
Erdogan’s speech at the American Enterprise Institute, January 29, 2004.
As a society, consisting predominantly of Muslims, Turkey will continue to make
contributions toward disseminating and developing universal values in this region.
Turkey feels this responsibility as a result of its democratic structure, rich
historical legacy and identity, economic potential, and its membership in Western
institutions. Moreover, these given [values] also shape Turkey’s national interests.
To be successful in this endeavor, we are first establishing these values firmly at
home, and will continue to do that. Turkey, a country which acts as a bridge
between the East and the West, Islam and Christianity, as well as Europe and
Asia, lives in harmony with traditions rooted in Islamic culture. In this sense,
Turkey in its region and especially in the Middle East will be a guide in
overcoming instability, a driving force for economic development, and a reliable
partner in ensuring security. Our relations in the future should be developed with
more substance and common understanding to facilitate the realization of the
regional and global vision that we share. It is necessary for us to more carefully
analyze the political and social development of societies as well as the role played
by identity in domestic and foreign policy. In this vein, to better understand
Muslim societies, a more objective view of Islam should be employed. That, the
Turkish Society is predominantly Muslim, has not prevented Turkey from
engaging in a comprehensive interaction with the West and from becoming an
important member of Western institutions and organizations.121

Ahmet Davutoglu - the former Prime Minister of Turkey (2014-2016) - is another
important factor for Turkish foreign policy’s involvement, under AKP government, in the
Middle East with his ‘strategic-depth’ and ‘zero problems with neighbors’ doctrines. These
doctrines foresee an independent and visionary role for Turkey in its region. “Davutoglu brought
an innovative framework to the Turkish foreign policy, a theoretical portrait for Turkey’s
diplomacy, a vision of steady and systematic foundation.”122 The AKP government assumed the
role of a regional power, during Davutoglu’s term as a Foreign Minister (2009-2014). The
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Turkish government assumed the role of arbitrator in the region. Davutoglu, focused on the
dispute between Israel and Palestine, Hamas and El-Fatah, EU- Iran, Bosnia-Herzegovina,
Kosovo’s conflict with Serbia, the US-Iran dispute and the ongoing civil war in Somalia.123 He
was motivated in turning Turkey into an international mediator. Davutoglu claimed that a
nation’s value in world politics is founded on its geo-strategic locations and historical depth. In
this regards, Turkey is uniquely positioned both because of its location in geopolitically strategic
areas and its historical legacy as successor to the Ottoman Empire. The AKP promotes an
independent foreign policy that puts Turkey’s relations with the West on a more equal footing
while simultaneously prioritizing the emergence of a Turkey-friendly regional environment in
the image of western norms.124 In January 2013, then Prime Minister Erdogan, declared in a
televised interview that he would consider Turkey’s membership in the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO) as an alternative to the European Union.125
Turkey assumed a foreign policy to complement the United States’ aspiration in the
region by embracing the role of mediator/peacemaker.126 This engagement consolidated
Turkey’s motivation in deeper ties with its neighbor. For the AKP, the fall of authoritarian
regimes during the Arab spring one after another proved to be a crucial opening to turn the crisis
in the region. The AKP government played the cards of anti-imperialism with Islamic, historical
and emotional ties, soft power, with these countries in order to distinguish Turkey from other
powers. Turkey’s emerging involvement in the Middle East, as a regional power, is linked to the
EU’s refusal of Turkey’s full membership in the EU. During the Arab spring, President Erdogan
referred to the sovereign rights of people, the legacy of Western imperialism in the Middle East
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region, Islamic history and values in his speeches and visits.127 Iran’s effort to develop its nuclear
weapon is a main concern for the international community. Turkey has felt the consequences of
the instability raised in the region and geography. Therefore, Turkey was actively involved in a
facilitation process between Iran and the West (P5+1). Although a comprehensive deal was
finally reached in July 2015, Turkey’s national interest, aspiration for soft power, and seeking
international prestige as well as humanitarian and moral approaches motivated Turkey along
with Brazil to facilitate an agreement on Iran’s nuclear program beginning 2008-2009.
The AKP government also initiated a reconciliation process between Serbia and BosniaHerzegovina based on its shared history and cultural practices. Bosnia-Herzegovina was one of
the most important strongholds of the Ottoman Empire against the Austria-Hungarian Empire for
more than 400 years. Cities such as Sarajevo and Mostar emerged as regional urban centers of
culture under the Ottoman Empire. Ankara initiated an engagement with the Balkan states in
1996, under the South East European Cooperation Process (SEECP). Davutoglu offered this
mediation to help overcome the differences between Croatia, Serbia and Bosnia under the
auspices of SEECP. These efforts produced the Istanbul Declaration of April 2010 between
Turkey, Serbia and Bosnia.128 According to Ahmet Davutoglu, the challenge for Turkey in the
twenty-first century is to redefine its place in Afro-Eurasia. Turkey considers itself at the center
of several intersecting geopolitical regions as opposed to an appendix of Europe and an outpost
of the West.129 The Balkans are a strategic link between Turkey and Western Europe. Turkey’s
relations with Albania are based on the Friendship and Cooperation Agreement signed in 1992,
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which was bolstered by Turgu Ozal’s (in 1993) offer of large-scale aid for economic
development and infrastructure improvement.130
After the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991, the Turkish government
reestablished its strategic relations with newly independent Turkic states in Central Asia and
Transcaucasia to turn the region into a sphere of special Turkish influence. Turkey officially
recognized Turkic-language speaking republics and signed a bundle of agreements to formalize
its cooperation in various economic and cultural areas. “Turkey’s relations with the independent
states of Central Asia and Transcaucasia are mainly driven by energy and kinship.”131 These are
mainly, oil and gas, Trans- Caspian Gas pipeline and Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline in the
Caspian Sea region from Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan. “From the very beginning
of their political independence, Turkey made great efforts to help the Central Asian states to
become economically independent by developing their national economies and the structural
basis of functioning market economies.”132 The Turkish government favored political rhetoric to
create a community of Turkic nations to embrace the more realistic aim of developing their
Turkic identity. Turkic States and Communities Friendship, Brotherhood and Cooperation
Foundation (TUDEV) was strongly influenced by Alparslan Turkes133 and other high level
Turkish politicians. Moreover, Turkey and Azerbaijan has always been considered as a brother
country, which has the motto of one nation, two states. Within this context, Turkish foreign
policy involvement with the Middle East and Turkic states is based on the Ottoman Empire
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heritage and national identity. (Map 1: Trans-Caspian Pipeline) and (Map 2: Baku-TbilisiCeyhan pipeline.)
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan are landlocked nations. They do not have complete
control over the utilization of their natural resources, as they are forced to ship
their oil and gas via pipelines that run through other countries in order to reach the
global market. Whoever controls the pipelines, controls the energy they contain,
which is vital to a country's economy and even military strength, as modern
militaries, with aircraft, armored vehicles, and gas-powered ships are reliant on
oil. 134
An effective energy outlet from the area to the West via Turkey is strategically
important for strengthening Turkey’s territorial integrity and prosperity. Turkish
business and industry are undertaking many efforts to consolidate and expand
their position in Central Asia. The Turkish government lends as much support as
it can to these efforts by providing financial and technical assistance to the central
Asian states.135
Map 3.The Trans-Caspian Pipeline
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Map 4. Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline

Conclusion
Some experts believe that Turkey’s international relations are influenced by fears of
foreign, mainly European, forces that are trying to dismantle the country.136 The Cold War’s end
dramatically affected Turkey’s foreign policy. In addition to the disappearance of the Soviet
threat, Turkey’s liberalization and integration into the world meant that the long-standing foreign
policy discourse as based on ‘threats’ to the country became meaningless.137 In this regard,
Turkish foreign policy is undergoing changes. Therefore, the country is seeking a new balance
between continuing a relationship with Europe and with a new cooperative engagement in the
Middle East and a multidimensional framework. Turkish foreign policy shifted from a focus on
sustaining Turkey’s survival to becoming a regional power and establishing allies in the Balkans
136
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and the Middle East, with the larger aim of resisting territorial ambitions of revisionist powers.
Turkey’s assertive involvement in the Middle East, Trans-Caucasus (Turkic states) and the
Balkans is to protect its national interests more vigorously than before. Its Ottoman history has
undoubtedly played an important role in the increased importance given by the AKP to
strengthening Turkey’s ties with the Muslim countries of the Middle East in order to reassert
itself as a major player in the region. “The official narrative in regard to Ottoman soft power is
overwhelmingly associated with Ottoman tolerance. Contemporary Turkish foreign policy
rhetoric and public diplomacy focuses on the Ottoman heritage and tolerance.”138
Islam is a religion both providing meaning to human existence and forming the basis of
individual and communal identities. Islam is the common bond that unites the representatives of
different geopolitical centers. Therefore, Islam has always influenced the social identity of
Turkish people and paved the way to the emergence of political, cultural and economic reforms.
In this context, since 2002, the AKP formed a single party majority government and carried out
an extensive transformation in Turkish politics. It is not possible to analyze Turkish foreign
policy’s involvement in the Middle East without reference to Islam and its Ottoman history.
Turkish leadership endeavored to deepen Turkey’s economic and political connections with the
Muslim and Turkic states in its neighborhood to enhance the regional cooperation. “Turkey’s
political establishment is increasingly on the lookout for foreign relations beyond the country’s
traditional exclusive orientation toward the West.”139 Within this context, in Davutoglu’s
understanding, there is little difference between Istanbul, Sarajevo, Grozny, or Baghdad for they
belong to the same geopolitical and civilization map, the Islamic world in general and the
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Ottoman cultural zone in particular. Thus, Turkey should abandon the traditional status-quo
oriented approaches and pursue a more proactive and dynamic foreign policy agenda.140
National identity represents necessary myths, the source of national pride, and the values which
underpin foreign policy. More importantly, it legitimizes the actions of government in defense of
national interest.141 Turkey is not severing ties with the European states but redefining its
relations while reaching out for a larger Eurasian role. Turgut Ozal initiated Turkey’s preference
to engage with the Islamic and Turkic world. He embraced the idea of close relations with the
newly independent Turkic states once the Soviet demise was clearly imminent. In the 1990s,
Necmettin Erbakan expressed the D-8 policy, which aimed to establish close relations between
Turkey and seven other large economically strong Muslim states: Iran, Egypt, Pakistan,
Bangladesh, Indonesia, Malaysia and Nigeria. Since 2002, after the AKP came to power, Turkish
foreign policy involvement with the Middle East and Turkic states is slowly but constantly
increasing. Turkey has a strategic location among Asia, the Middle East and Europe. This
geographic location provides engagement opportunities and aspiration for Turkey with
neighboring Europe, the Middle East, Turkic states and its former Ottoman space. “Turkey’s
national borders are only relevant on paper. Turkey has cultural, linguistic, economic and ethnic
spillovers in all directions. Now it is time to reap the rewards of this versatility. However, all of
these opportunities had to be realized and utilized by the understanding that they were always
there but never activated.”142
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As I am writing this essay, (November 2016) another emerging opportunity is for Turkey
to join the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).143 Turkey is currently a ‘dialogue partner’
in the SCO. President Erdogan said on November 21, 2016, “Turkey should not be ‘fixated’ on
the idea of joining the European Union and should look at other opportunities, such as the
Russian-led Shanghai Pact.”144 President Erdogan joined the SCO’s 16th meeting of the Heads of
States Council, which was held in the Uzbekistan’s capital in Tashkent, June 2016. During the
meeting it was emphasized that the enlargement process of the SCO would continue at a steady
pace and Turkey's full membership in the organization was supported by various participants.
President Erdogan said during his visit to China in July 2016 that Turkey wants to move its
position in the organization from a partner to a full member.145 President Erdogan also said that
“the EU has been delaying us [Turkey] for 53 years. How can such a thing happen? Moreover,
Turkey being a part of the Shanghai 5 will allow it to act more freely [in its EU bid].”146
Meanwhile, the European Parliament in Strasbourg, France, voted on Thursday (November 24,
2016) to suspend talks with Turkey on European Union membership. However, the vote is not
binding, since the decision ultimately rests with the governments of the European Union’s
member countries.147
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CHAPTER VI
Conclusion and Discussion

This thesis argues that Turkey’s foreign policy includes not only the development of a
relationship with the European Union, but also with the Middle East and the Turkic states in the
region. I also analyze Turkey’s foreign policy activism for change and continuity under the AKP
government. Turkey is a pivotal country, strategically located at the center of the Afro-Eurasian
region. Turkey has a strong interest in maintaining the status quo along with extending its
influence in Europe, the Middle East, the Balkans, the Caucasus, Central Asia, the Caspian and
the Mediterranean. The change and continuity of Turkish foreign policy under the AKP, since
2002, is to extend its geo-strategic ambitions to multiple regions under a multidimensional
approach by using its geographical position. The AKP is not shifting Turkish Foreign policy
from the West to the East. Turkey is simply expanding its foreign policy.148 These changes bear
the mark of a multidimensional array of international, regional and domestic dynamics. Turkey’s
involvement is not only in the Middle East but also includes Afro-Euroasia based on Turkey’s
historic role stemming from the legacy of the Ottoman Empire. In this context, Turkey has
multiple identities in the region and each of these identities link Turkey with different regions.
For example:
1. Turkey’s historic Ottomanism and Islamic identity create bonds in the Middle East and
the Muslim world.
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2. ‘Turkisim’ or ‘Turkishness’ epmhasizes the importance of accepting Turkish culture as a
political and territorial concept among Turkic Republics in Central Asia and Causcasus
based on an ancient cultural tradition for Turkic unity.
3. Turkey has undergone sweeping reforms due to Turkey’s accession process for full
membership in the European Union, especially since the AKP came to power in 2001.
National identity emerges within a historical context. The origins of Turkish identity
trace back to the Ottoman Empire where geography played an important role in shaping national
identities’ in the empire. The Ottoman identity was rooted in the East, in the Turkic tribes’
Central Asia and as well as the traditions of Islam. Ottoman intellectuals developed the idea of
Ottomanism –unity of elements- or the idea of Ottoman patriotisim, Islamism - the idea of unity
of all Muslims (ittihad-i Islam)- and Turkish nationalism to find a common ground for its diverse
population.149 In this context, Turkey’s geographical and historical richness as a source of soft
power are reflected in the region. Turkey as a regional power was accomplished through the
desire to maintain its status gained in the long legacy of the Ottoman Empire.Turkey is a status
quo power which promotes and ensures the international system through amending and
balancing its foreign policy. Therefore, Turkey should seek the role of a major power utilizing its
own sources of power, history, and geography. In this regard, in order to understand the aims of
global ambition and power, Turkey should be more proactive and reactive in its geo-strategic and
geo-political positioning in order to demand its re-assessed place in the world.
Gaining regional and then global power is a costly business. Turkey is able to maintain
and increase its steady pursuit of allies to form a greater power-bloc in the region for the
country’s geo-strategic expansionism including full membership with the European Union,
149
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despite obstacles and decades of the prolonged accession process in the EU. The ambivalent
accession process over Turkey’s EU candidacy shows that the EU still has a very long way to go
if it aspires to be a Kantian federation of Europe. No matter how modern and secular the
European self-understanding; its modernity and secularism is heavily indebted to an
Enlightenment rooted in Christianity.150 Turkey’s bid for EU membership is essential for the
region in order to link Afro-Asia to Europe. Only Turkey can play this important role because of
its geopolitical and geostrategic location connecting both continents. Turkey as a Eurasian
country has influence over its surrounding regions. Turkey calls itself a status quo power.
According to political scientist Randall Schweller’s description “Status-quo states are content to
preserve the essential characteristics of the existing international order and the general
distribution of power.”151 Therefore, Turkey, as a status quo state occupies a space that could
embrace shared norms in order to ensure the survival of the global system. By reaching across
three continents, the AKP government’s foreign policy has been a response to changes in the
international system, characterized by globalization and an increasingly multipolar international
system.152 In sum, Turkey is increasingly pursuing an active foreign policy approach with the
continuation of the EU membership process under a multidimensional foreign policy to deal with
regional and global issues in a more effective method. AKP government has a liberal-oriented
geopolitical practice in shaping Turkey’s regional policy and it has an Islamist geopolitical
vision in terms of connecting history and culture to foreign policy.
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List of Abbreviations
AKP

Justice and Development Party

ANAP

Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi)

DAESH

Islamic State of Iraq and Levant

D-8

Organization for Economic Cooperation (also known as Developing-8)

EC

European Community

EEC

European Economic Community

ECtHR

European Court of Human Rights

ENP

European Neighborhood Policy

EU

European Union

FP

Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi)

G-20

The Group of Twenty

ISIS or ISIL

Islamic State of Iraq and Levant

MSP

National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi)

MNP

National Order Party (Milli Nizam Partisi)

P5+1

UN Security Council's five permanent members (the P5); namely China, France,
Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States; plus (+1) is Germany.

PKK

Kurdistan Worker’s Party

RP

Welfare Party (Refah Partisi)

SCO

Shanghai Cooperation Organization

SDGs

Development Goals

SEECP

South East European Cooperation Process

TFP

Turkish foreign policy

TUDEV

Turkic States and Communities Friendship, Brotherhood and Cooperation
Foundation

UN

United Nations

UEFA

the Union of European Football Associations

USA

the United States of America
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